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Earnings Restatements, Changes in CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Prior research finds that earnings restatements are linked to CEOs’ excessive 
option-based compensation and equity holdings. In this paper, we investigate whether 
firms that experience earnings restatements recontract with their CEOs to reduce their 
option-based compensation and if so, whether this leads to improved firm performance. 
Based on 289 restatement firms over the period 1997-2001, we find that the proportion of 
CEOs’ compensation in the form of options declines significantly in the two years 
following the restatement. Furthermore, we document that this reduction is accompanied 
by a decrease in the riskiness of investments, as reflected in lower stock return volatility 
and subsequent improvements in operating performance. Our results suggest that a 
decrease in option-based compensation reduces CEOs’ incentives to take excessively 
risky investments, resulting in improved profitability. Overall, our findings provide 
insights into the design and efficacy of CEO compensation contracts. 
 
JEL classification: G30, G32, J33, M4.  
 
Keywords: Earnings restatements; Stock options; CEO compensation; Operating 
performance 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the design and efficacy of chief 
executive officer (CEO) compensation contracts following an earnings restatement. In the 
late 1990s, corporate America was seemingly awash in financial reporting failures. The 
United States General Accounting Office (GAO 2002) documented an astounding total of 
919 restatements from January 1997 to June 2002. A chorus of critics argues that stock-
based compensation is responsible for these financial reporting failures (Levitt 1998; 
Knowledge at Wharton 2003). For example, Jensen (2005) suggests that overvalued 
equity can lead to agency problems, whereby managers use aggressive accounting to 
maintain the overvaluation when they cannot continue producing stellar results, thus 
reducing the core value of the firm. Jensen suggests that stock-based compensation, 
especially option-based compensation, is at the root of the damaging effects of aggressive 
accounting because it encourages managers to increase short-term stock prices (The 
Economist 2002; Jensen 2005). 
Consistent with these claims, an emerging body of academic work has established a 
link between stock-based compensation and earnings restatements. For example, Efendi, 
Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) find a positive relation between the likelihood of an 
earnings restatement and the level of executive stock options that are deep in-the-money. 
Burns and Kedia (2006) find that incentives to misreport earnings increase with the 
sensitivity of CEO’s option holdings to both stock price and volatility.  
The cost of aggressive accounting to firms is substantial. Palmrose, Richardson, and 
Scholz (2004) document a decline of 10% in a restatement firm’s market value at the 
announcement of the restatement. Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2006) document substantial 
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penalties on firms involved in financial misreporting. These penalties include billions of 
dollars in monetary fines and reputation loss.  
Given these costs and the importance of the relation between compensation 
contracts and accounting failures, rational firms should recontract with their CEOs to 
reduce such costs. However, there is little research on the changes in compensation 
contracts following a restatement. In this study, we seek to fill this gap by investigating 
the association between the revelation of an earnings restatement and subsequent changes 
in CEO option-based compensation, and economic consequences of these changes.  
Because the findings in prior research imply that restatement firms’ CEO equity 
incentives are “too high” relative to those of control firms, we expect restatement firms to 
reduce these incentives following a restatement, provided that doing so results in a net 
benefit. Given that firms have a limited ability to reduce CEOs’ existing equity holdings, 
we focus our analyses on changes in new grants of stock options. We expect that option 
grants in the post-restatement period will be lower than those in the pre-restatement 
period. Our results are consistent with this expectation. Using a sample of 289 
restatements and the year prior to restatement announcement as the benchmark year, we 
find that while total CEO compensation does not significantly change by the second year 
after the restatement announcement, there is a significant shift from option-based 
compensation to salary over this period. In univariate tests, we find that the proportion of 
the value of option grants to total compensation declined by 5.6 percentage points for the 
restatement firms, while control firms experienced an increase of 2.6 percentage points in 
this proportion over the same period. The analyses indicate that the number of option 
grants also declines for restatement firms compared to control firms. The reduction in the 
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use of option grants for restatement firms holds after we control for the level of stock and 
option holdings as well as other determinants of option-based compensation, such as firm 
size, growth opportunities, leverage, idiosyncratic risk, R&D intensity, stock returns, cash 
compensation, and industry and year fixed effects. Because about half of the restatement 
firms experienced CEO turnover after restatements, we also investigate the change in 
option grants separately for extant and new CEOs. We find that our results hold for both 
extant and new CEOs.  
Because prior research that finds a relation between equity incentives and 
restatements uses the year prior to the earliest year restated as the benchmark year, we 
assess the sensitivity of our results using this benchmark instead of the year prior to the 
restatement announcement. Our inferences remain unaffected by this test, although the 
magnitude of the change in option grants is slightly smaller. We also test whether 
restatement firms changed option-based compensation from this alternative benchmark to 
the year prior to the restatement announcement and find that these firms actually 
increased option-based compensation over this period. This result indicates that 
restatement firms only made remedies after the problem with aggressive financial 
reporting was publicly known. 
Our results are also robust to a battery of other sensitivity tests, including expanding 
the sample to include other top executives, using industry-year matched control firms, 
controlling for changes in the joint CEO/COB position and restatement specific 
characteristics, and using alternative sample years. We also find that there is a reduction 
in the sensitivity of the value of option grants to both stock price and return volatility, 
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consistent with reduced incentives to engage in opportunistic activities and excessive 
risk-taking.   
If the reduction in option-based compensation is a result of unwarranted negative 
public perception of option usage, we would expect a decrease in firm performance as 
firms deviate from optimal contracting. However, if restatements result from too high a 
level of incentive compensation and the reduction in option compensation after the 
restatement better aligns managerial incentives with those of shareholders, we would 
expect to observe improved firm performance. To test this expectation, we examine 
subsequent performance and find that compared to control firms, restatement firms that 
reduced their CEO’s option compensation on average experienced an increase in return 
on assets (ROA) of 2.1% (5.6%) in the first year (the first two years) after this reduction. 
For firms that did not reduce CEO option-based compensation, however, we do not find 
evidence of improved operating performance. Additional analyses indicate that self-
selection bias (whether restatement firms reduce option grants or not), CEO turnover, 
“big bath” accounting charges, abnormal accruals, and mean reversion of ROA do not 
drive the ROA results.  
One way that operating performance can improve is through a reduction in 
excessively risky investments. While options can be used to induce managers to take 
risky positive net present value projects, too high a level of options can induce excessive 
risk-taking in investment decisions. When these investments do not produce net positive 
returns, managers may engage in earnings management to mask underperformance. This 
can ultimately result in a restatement. After the reduction in option-based compensation, 
the convexity of CEOs’ compensation contracts decreases. Consequently, the incentive to 
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take excessively risky projects is reduced and operating performance likely improves as a 
result. Consistent with this argument, we report that relative to control firms, restatement 
firms that reduce option compensation experience a significant decrease in stock return 
volatility, a common proxy for the riskiness of investments, while those restatement firms 
that do not reduce option compensation do not have such a reduction. 
Overall, our results imply that economic benefits accrue to restatement firms that 
reduce their CEOs’ option-based compensation, indicating that the reduction in option 
grants helps adjust managers’ equity incentives toward optimal levels. A natural question 
that follows is if reducing option usage is associated with improved firm performance, 
why is it that all restatement firms do not do so? To help answer this question, we 
conduct a within-sample analysis. We find that the likelihood of a reduction in options 
usage is positively related to the level of option grants prior to the restatement and in 
some specifications, this likelihood is higher for income-decreasing restatements.   
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, it extends the 
growing literature that examines changes in monitoring mechanisms following 
accounting failures by documenting a significant reduction in option-based compensation 
after a restatement. Our paper thus complements extant studies that investigate changes in 
management and board membership following accounting failures (e.g., Beneish 1999; 
Desai et al. 2006; Farber 2005; Srinivasan 2005). Taken together, these studies indicate 
that firms with financial reporting failures improve their monitoring mechanisms to 
address their agency problem. Our evidence may also be useful to restatement firms that 
are considering or are using compensation policy as part of a strategy to recover from the 
fallout of a restatement.  
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Second, our paper extends the literature on the relation between managerial 
ownership (including stock options) and firm performance. To date, the evidence of such 
a relation is mixed (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Morck et al. 1988). It is difficult to 
identify a relation between stock-based compensation and firm performance in a general 
setting because in equilibrium firms choose the optimal level of CEO stock-based 
compensation (Hanlon et al. 2003; Larker 2003). Core et al. (2003, p.35) argue that “… 
an effective sample for testing the link between ownership and firm value is a set of firms 
for which managerial equity ownership levels are too low (high), but then recontract to 
increase (decrease) ownership.” In this study, we have the advantage of being able to 
exploit an event (i.e., restatement) that highlights the off-equilibrium level of CEO equity 
incentives to examine the relation between equity ownership and firm performance.1 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an 
overview of the related literature and develop our hypothesis for the change in option-
based compensation. In Section 3, we present our sample and data. Section 4 reports the 
empirical results for the change in option-based compensation following restatements. 
Section 5 documents the efficacy of changes in option-based compensation after 
restatements. We summarize and conclude in Section 6. 
2. Prior Research and Hypothesis for the Change in Option-based Compensation 
Our paper is related to studies that investigate the association of equity incentives 
and aggressive financial reporting, and to studies that document the costs of financial 
                                                 
1 Core and Larcker (2002) use an off-equilibrium setting in which firms adopt ownership target plans. They 
find that after the adoption of such plans, firms in which CEOs increase their equity ownership experience 
improved performance.  
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reporting failures. Below, we briefly review these studies and develop our hypothesis for 
the change in option-based compensation.  
Managerial ownership and stock-based compensation, such as option grants and 
stock grants, are important mechanisms designed to align managers’ incentives with 
those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Smith and Stulz 1985; Morck et al. 
1988). Accordingly, the wealth of managers who receive stock-based compensation is 
sensitive to their firms’ stock prices. While this sensitivity can motivate managers to 
make value-increasing operating, financing, and investment decisions, it can also induce 
managers, even those who are well-intentioned, to fixate on short-term stock prices. As 
argued and documented in Yermack (1995) and Cheng and Warfield (2005), there is a 
positive relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and their insider selling activity. 
Accordingly, the wealth of these managers is sensitive to short-term stock prices. To 
increase the short-term stock price and their personal wealth, CEOs might engage in 
earnings management, which can lead to earnings restatements. 
Equity incentives, especially option holdings, are also important for inducing risk-
averse managers to choose risky positive net present value projects. Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987) document a positive relation between ownership in the form of stock 
and option holdings and a firm’s stock return variance, which reflects the underlying 
riskiness of investments.2 Guay (1999) finds that stock return variance is positively 
related to the convexity of compensation contracts. Defusco et al. (1990) find an increase 
in stock return variance after the approval of stock option plans. All of these studies 
suggest that stock options motivate managers to increase stock return volatility by 
                                                 
2 Using the context of Oil and Gas companies, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find a positive relation between 
risk taking and stock return volatility. 
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undertaking risky projects. However, when option holdings are too high, managers might 
engage in excessive risk taking, such as over-investing in risky capital projects, research 
and development (R&D), or marketing activities. When these risky investments do not 
produce net positive returns, managers may attempt to mask the resulting 
underperformance with earnings management, which can ultimately result in a 
restatement (Burns and Kedia 2006).3  
There is an emerging line of academic literature that examines the link between 
stock-based compensation and aggressive financial reporting. Using various proxies for 
earnings management, such as meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts and abnormal 
accruals, Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that 
CEOs with high equity incentives are more likely to engage in earnings management. 
More closely related to our study, a set of papers has found that incentive misalignment 
in the form of excessive option compensation led to restatements. Using 95 firms 
announcing earnings restatements over the period 2001-2002, Efendi et al. (2007) find a 
positive relation between the value of CEOs’ options that are deep in-the-money and the 
probability of an earnings restatement. Burns and Kedia (2006) use 215 restatements 
announced over the period 1995-2002 and find that the sensitivity of CEOs’ option 
portfolio to both stock price and return volatility is positively associated with the 
probability of misreporting earnings. Finally, Harris and Bromiley (2006) analyze 434 
restatements announced over the period 1997-2002 and find that compared to 
counterparts in other firms, CEOs in restatement firms receive a higher proportion of 
their compensation in the form of stock options.  
                                                 
3 Cassidy (2002) and Madrick (2003) provide anecdotal evidence that fixation on short-term stock price and 
excessive risk taking are associated with the recent spate of accounting scandals and that option 
compensation underlies the problem.  
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Earnings management and particularly earnings restatements are costly to a firm 
and its managers. It is well-documented that restatements are associated with a decrease 
of about 10% in firm market value (GAO 2002; Palmrose et al. 2004; Wu 2002). Prior 
research (e.g., Ducharme et al. 2004; Lu 2003) also finds that the likelihood of litigation 
increases with the extent of earnings management. In particular, Peng and Roell (2004) 
find that executive incentive pay increases the probability of securities class-action 
litigation and that this correlation is at least partly driven by earnings management 
induced by executive incentive pay. Karpoff et al. (2006) provide detailed documentation 
of the outcome of such litigation. In particular, they find that companies involved in 
financial misrepresentations in the 1978-2002 period incurred about $13.6 billion in fines 
and class-action lawsuit damages and a reputational penalty of about $100 billion. 
In sum, the extant literature has documented a positive relation between CEOs’ 
equity incentives and costly financial reporting failures. Our paper extends this literature 
by examining whether firms mitigate their agency problems related to earnings 
restatements by adjusting CEOs’ equity incentives. To induce managers to make more 
efficient strategic and operational decisions, such as reducing excessive risk-taking and to 
reduce the potential for future earnings management, restatement firms can reduce their 
CEOs’ equity incentives. However, restatement firms have limited remedies available to 
make such a change because these firms cannot force their CEOs to liquidate their 
existing equity holdings. As argued and found in Core and Guay (1999), firms use the 
flow of equity incentives (i.e., stock and option grants) to adjust managers’ total equity 
incentives to an optimal level. Thus, restatement firms can adjust CEOs’ option-based 
compensation downward to a more optimal level. While firms can also adjust their 
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CEOs’ restricted stock grants, doing so is unlikely to be effective because restricted stock 
grants have not been identified in the literature as an important determinant of earnings 
restatements and because restricted stock grants are less frequently used and have a 
smaller magnitude than option grants (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Efendi et al. 2007).  
The preceding discussion leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative 
form: 
H1: Compared to control firms, restatement firms will experience a decrease 
in their CEOs’ option-based compensation from the pre-restatement 
period to the post-restatement period.  
 
A natural question that arises is why firms’ compensation contracts with managers 
are suboptimal prior to a restatement and why they become more optimal afterward. To 
help explain this, we appeal to arguments in Core and Guay (1999) and Core, Guay, and 
Larcker (2003). The essence of these arguments is that compensation contracts may not 
always be optimal for two reasons. First, it is likely that firms do not know that the 
compensation contracts are suboptimal. In our case, it is possible that the effect of option-
based compensation on earnings management and the corresponding costs of earnings 
restatements are unknown to the firm prior to the restatement announcements. The 
restatement announcement then highlights to firms that their CEOs’ incentive 
compensation is suboptimal and therefore should be adjusted toward a more optimal 
level. Second, while firms may initially contract optimally with their CEOs, over time 
CEOs’ equity incentives can become misaligned with optimal levels for a variety of 
reasons. For example, firm and/or manager characteristics can change – the firm grows or 
its investment opportunities shift and managers may exercise stock options for personal 
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consumption. The incentives provided by option grants can also change over time 
because of changes in firm volatility, for example. Because it is costly to recontract 
continuously, firms will only do it when a net benefit exists. One significant benefit of 
recontracting is the reduction in incentives to chase excessively risky projects. A 
potential cost of cutting option grants is that managers may not work as hard as before or 
may not make risky investments as preferred by shareholders. If this cost is too high, 
restatement firms will not reduce CEOs’ option grants and we will not find results 
consistent with H1. Whether reducing option grants provides a net benefit ex post is an 
empirical question that we examine later in this paper.  
Also, we may not find results consistent with H1 is if our assumption that CEOs’ 
equity incentives are “too high” for restatement firms does not hold. A positive relation 
between equity incentives and the likelihood of reporting failures is not universal. In 
contrast to the above-mentioned studies, Erickson et al. (2006) fail to find such a relation 
using a sample of 50 firms cited by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for 
fraud. Although Erickson et al. (2006) do not reconcile their findings with studies that 
find such an association, the differences in the nature of the events examined (i.e., 
restatement vs. fraud) and sample size may explain the different results.4, 5  
Note that our study is related to, but different from, studies that examine the link 
between accounting rules for option grants and the level of stock option compensation 
(Brown and Lee 2007; Carter et al. 2007; Darrough and Li 2006). These papers document 
a reduction in option usage in response to the passage of SFAS 123(R) and they attribute 
                                                 
4 We note that the SEC cited only 15 of our sample firms for fraud.  
5 In untabulated analyses, we directly examine whether our restatement firms have higher equity incentives 
than control firms in the year immediately preceding restatement. We find significantly higher equity 
incentives for restatement firms, thus providing support for the critical assumption underlying H1. 
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the build-up in options usage to accounting rules in place prior to SFAS 123(R). Because 
these prior rules did not require firms to expense option-based compensation if the 
exercise price is the same as the stock price at the option grant date, they essentially 
provided firms with a subsidy that encouraged the use of options. This might help explain 
why restatement firms have excessive levels of option-based compensation. However, 
our sample precedes the passage of SFAS 123(R) and thus the phenomenon documented 
in these studies should not confound our results.  
3. Sample and Data  
3.1 Sample of Restatement Firms 
We obtain restatement data from GAO (2002), which contains earnings 
restatements announced in the period January 1997 to June 2002. According to the GAO, 
these restatements include only those due to an accounting irregularity, which GAO 
(2002) defines as “…an instance in which a company restates its financial statements 
because they were not fairly presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). This would include material errors and fraud (GAO 2002, p2).”  
Table 1, Panel A presents the restatement sample reconciliation. The GAO report 
identifies 919 restatements. Because we require a two-year post-restatement period and 
because ExecuComp only provided compensation data through 2003 at the time of data 
collection, we exclude 135 observations with fiscal years later than 2001. We lose 
another 204 and 55 observations because of missing data from Compustat and CRSP, 
respectively. We lose 228 observations because of missing compensation data for the pre- 
or post-restatement period. Finally, we lose eight observations because of multiple 
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restatements in the same year, bringing our final sample to 289 restatements. The sample 
size for specific analyses varies with the availability of additional data. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the yearly distribution of the sample restatements. Our 
sample period spans the years 1997 to 2001, with most of the restatements (79%) 
announced in the years 1999 to 2001. We provide the distribution of restatement 
characteristics in Panel C of Table 1. As indicated in that panel, company-initiated 
restatements account for the largest share of total restatements (40%). More than half of 
the restatement firms are Nasdaq-listed. The largest percentage of restatements involves 
revenue accounts (43.9%). Panel D of Table 1 shows that our sample firms are from a 
broad spectrum of industries. Panel E of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of 
restatement firms’ financial characteristics in the year of restatement. Our restatement 
firms have a market value of $3.9 billion on average and are profitable, with a mean net 
operating income of $166 million. The mean book-to-market and leverage ratios are 
0.672 and 0.187, respectively. 
These descriptive statistics are similar to those presented in the GAO (2002) report 
and in prior studies, indicating that our sample is similar to that used in prior research. 
Also consistent with prior studies, the average abnormal return for the three days centered 
on the restatement announcement date is -6.7% for our sample (untabulated).  
3.2 Compensation Data 
Generally, a CEO’s compensation is comprised of salary, bonus, stock options, 
restricted stock, and other long-term incentives. Recall that because firms have a limited 
ability to reduce their CEOs’ equity incentives, we hypothesize that restatement firms 
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will reduce option-based compensation for CEOs after the restatements. We measure 
option-based compensation in two alternative ways: (i) the ratio of the dollar value of 
option grants to total compensation ($Option%) and (ii) the ratio of the number of option 
grants in shares scaled by total shares outstanding (#Option%): 
100*
($) oncompensati Total
grants($) option Annual   $Option% =  
100*
goutstandin  sharesTotal
 shares)grants(in option Annual   Option%# =  
For $Option%, we use the dollar value of annual option grants provided by the company 
in its proxy statement.6 The results are similar when we use the Black-Scholes value for 
the sub-sample of restatement firms that have this data available from ExecuComp.  
We obtain executive compensation and management ownership data either from 
ExecuComp or directly from proxy statements. We are able to obtain compensation data 
for 125 restatement firms from ExecuComp, which contains executive compensation data 
for the S&P 1500 firms. For the remaining 164 restatement firms, we hand-collect 
compensation data, as well as the stock/option holding data from proxy statements. For 
each restatement firm, we collect compensation data for the four-year period [t-1, t+2] 
around the restatement announcement, where year t is the fiscal year in which the 
restatement was announced. Year t-1 is used as the benchmark to evaluate the change in 
option grants after restatements.7  
                                                 
6 Per SEC rule, firms must provide in their proxy statements an estimate of the value of option grants using 
one of two methods. The first is to calculate the potential realizable value of option based on a 5% and 10% 
annual rate of appreciation for the stock over the term of the option. The second is to use an option pricing 
model, such as Black-Scholes. In our sample, the most common method is the 5% and 10% appreciation 
method, under which the option value is the present value of the difference between future stock price, 
which appreciates 5% and 10% every year, and the exercise price at the option expiration date. In our 
analyses, we use the potential realizable value based on the 5% annual appreciation rate for all firm-years.  
7 Because proxy statements are generally issued four or five months after the end of the fiscal year, the 
proxy statement for fiscal year t-1 might be issued after the restatement announcement for firms with 
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In Table 2, we provide distributional statistics of total CEO compensation and its 
components for restatement firms in the pre-restatement (year t-1) and post-restatement 
period (years t+1 and t+2). In year t-1, the mean total compensation is about 3.68 million 
dollars. The largest component of compensation is option grants, which averages 2.4 
million dollars, almost 10 times the magnitude of restricted stock grants. Quartile analysis 
reveals that both the value and number of option grants are highly skewed, with mean 
values far in excess of the medians. Similarly, the distribution of the value of restricted 
stock is also highly skewed, with a median value of zero across all years presented. Cash-
based compensation is a smaller component of total compensation, with an average salary 
of $431,300 and an average bonus of $371,900. Because the results for changes in means 
and medians from t-1 to t+2 are qualitatively similar, we only provide results for changes 
in means for brevity. From t-1 to t+1, total compensation and its components do not 
change significantly. While total compensation does not change significantly from t-1 to 
t+2, there are offsetting changes between option grants and other components of 
compensation – the mean dollar value of option grants declines significantly (p=0.08), 
while other components of compensation increase by a similar amount. However, of the 
changes in these other components, only the increase in salary is significant (p= 0.03).8 
Consistent with the decline in the dollar value of option grants, we also provide evidence 
that option grants as a percentage of outstanding shares significantly decline from t-1 to 
t+2 (p=0.03, two-sided).  
                                                                                                                                                 
restatements disclosed early in their fiscal year. Thus, the information provided in such proxy statements 
might be affected by restatements. To ensure that restatements do not affect option-based compensation in 
the benchmark year, if the proxy statement for year t-1 is filed after the restatement announcement, we use 
year t-2 as the benchmark year. 
8 While the magnitude of the change in restricted stock appears large, it is not statistically significant 
different from zero. For sensitivity, we use the sum of restricted stock and option grants as the dependent 
variable and obtain similar results to those reported. We also analyze restricted stock grants separately in a 
multiple regression test and find insignificant results.  
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Overall, these findings suggest a shift from incentive-based compensation to fixed 
compensation for restatement firms. The next section provides formal tests of this 
structural change. 
4. Changes in CEO Option-based Compensation after Restatements 
4.1 Research Design 
To test H1, we adopt a difference-in-difference approach. We first compare the pre- 
and post-restatement levels of restatement firms’ CEO option grants to calculate the 
change in option grants around restatements. This change controls for the impact of time-
invariant firm characteristics on CEO compensation structure, such as industry 
membership. Then we compare this change to the change in option grants for control 
firms’ CEOs over the same period. Comparing restatement firms with control firms is 
necessary because of the temporal trend in CEO compensation structure over our analysis 
period (Murphy 1999). Following Core and Larcker (2002), we identify a control sample 
by using all ExecuComp firm-years that have the required data over the period 1997-
2001, but are not included in our restatement sample. For each control firm, in year t, we 
measure option grants in the year before and the two years afterward, and calculate the 
change in option grants as the corresponding difference.  
Firm characteristics can change around earnings restatements. For example, firms 
become smaller and less profitable. Such changes can potentially confound our analyses. 
To address this issue, we use the following OLS regression to control for the impact of 
other determinants of stock-based compensation:  
εαα ++∆++=∆ − DummiesYearControlstRestatemenGrantsOption β10 ,   (1) 
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where ∆Option_Grants is defined as the difference in $Option% or #Option% between 
the post- and pre-restatement periods. Restatement is a dummy variable with value 1 for 
restatement firms and value 0 for control firms. Controls represent a set of variables 
known to influence stock-based compensation. Prior research finds that option-based 
compensation decreases with CEO stock and option ownership and financial leverage, 
and increases with firm size, growth opportunities (proxied by market-to-book ratio, 
R&D intensity), cash constraints, idiosyncratic risk, and current as well as past stock 
returns. Prior research also finds that the use of option grants is related to earnings 
constraints and cash compensation, but there is no conclusive evidence on the direction of 
the effect. To save space, we relegate details for the control variables – the argument 
underlying the predictions and the detailed measurement – to the Appendix. Because we 
investigate the change in stock-based compensation, we likewise use the change in 
control variables in our regression analyses. To be consistent with prior studies, we use 
the lagged changes of these controls (e.g., Core and Guay 1999). For example, when 
analyzing the change in option grants from year t-1 to year t+2, we use the difference in 
controls between t-2 and t+1, except as indicated otherwise. Finally, we include year 
dummies to control for year-specific effects.9 
4.2 Empirical Tests of Changes in Option-based Compensation 
Table 3 reports the mean difference in option grants between the pre-restatement 
period (i.e., year t-1) and the post-restatement period (years t+1, t+2). Because it is 
unclear when restatement firms will change their CEOs’ compensation structure, we 
                                                 
9 For sensitivity, we also include industry dummies, leaving our results unaffected. Results are also 
unaffected when we only include one observation from each control firm to address any potential cross-
sectional correlation in the error term. 
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analyze years t+1 and t+2. We provide analyses of both $Option% (Panel A) and 
#Option% (Panel B) in this and subsequent tables whenever appropriate. As shown in 
Panel A of Table 3, there is no significant difference in the change in $Option% between 
restatement and control firms for the period t-1 to t+1. Over this period, both restatement 
and control firms experience an increase in $Option%, although only the increase for 
control firms is significantly different from zero. In contrast, for the period t-1 to t+2, 
restatement firms experience a decrease in $Option% of 5.6 percentage points, which is 
significantly less than the change in $Option% for the control sample, which actually 
increases its $Option% by 2.6 percentage points over this same period. 10, 11 Our 
inferences are the same when using the share-based measure of option grants. 
Specifically, for the period t-1 to t+2, restatement firms experience a decrease in 
#Option% of 0.13 percentage points, which is significantly less than the change in 
#Option% of 0.00 percentage points for the control sample. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Thus far, the results from our univariate analyses are supportive of our hypothesis 
that a restatement is associated with a subsequent reduction in the use of option 
compensation. Next, we use multiple regressions to examine whether other determinants 
of stock-based compensation drive our univariate results. Because we find no change in 
option grant usage over the period t-1 to t+1 in our univariate analyses, we focus our 
regression analyses on the period t-1 to t+2.  
                                                 
10 The median decrease in $Option% over the period t-1 to t+2 is significantly less for restatement firms 
than for control firms, based on a Wilcoxon test (p=0.06, two-sided). 
11 Two years may seem to be a long period to elapse before restatement firms make significant changes in 
option grants. However, after a restatement, firms might need to institute other changes that would likely 
occur before changes in compensation structure. For example, a firm is likely to hire a new CEO and 
change its board, which take a non-trivial amount of time to complete.  
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Panel A of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
regression analyses (for both the sample and control firms). Over our analysis period, 
there is a decreasing trend in share ownership and cash constraint, and an increasing trend 
in option holdings, firm size, book-to-market ratio, earnings constraint, and leverage.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the correlations between the variables used in our 
regression analysis. Consistent with the univariate analysis, the changes in both 
$Option% and #Option% are significantly negatively correlated with the Restatement 
dummy. The correlations between changes in option grants and the control variables are 
generally significant in the predicted directions. Also, relative to control firms, 
restatement firms experienced reduced equity holdings and cash constraint, and increased 
book-to-market ratio and earnings constraint. None of these correlations appears large 
enough to present collinearity problems. The largest correlation is between the size 
variable (∆Size) and cash compensation (∆Cash Compensation), which has a correlation 
coefficient of -0.47.  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of regressing ∆$Option% on the restatement 
dummy variable and controls. We report a coefficient of -7.8 on the restatement dummy 
variable (significant at the 1% level).12 This finding implies that the change in option-
based compensation as a percentage of total compensation is 7.8 percentage points lower 
for restatement firms than that for non-restatement firms over our analysis period, as 
predicted in H1. This change is economically significant; it implies that, holding total 
compensation constant, restatement firms reduce option grants by $290,554 (i.e., 
                                                 
12 Inferences are unaffected after deleting outliers with the absolute value of R-student greater than 2, or 
using decile ranks for the change in options usage. 
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7.8%×$3,677,900, which is the average total compensation in year t-1), relative to control 
firms.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Coefficients on the control variables for which we predict a sign are significant in 
the predicted direction, except that size, R&D, current returns, and cash compensation 
have insignificant coefficients and the coefficient on idiosyncratic risk has the sign 
opposite to our prediction. CEOs with high stock or option ownership and CEOs of firms 
with high leverage or idiosyncratic risk are awarded fewer option grants, while firms that 
have low book-to-market ratios, that have cash constraints, and that have high past 
returns award their CEOs more option grants.  
Panel A of Table 5 also presents regression results of using ∆#Option% as the 
dependent variable; the inferences using this variable are the same as those based on 
∆$Option%. Specifically, we find that the change in #Option% for restatement firms is 
0.16 percentage points lower for restatement firms than for non-restatement firms.  
One complication that arises in our setting is that a restatement is frequently 
associated with CEO turnover (e.g., Desai et al. 2006). We find that approximately one-
half of our restatement firms experience CEO turnover from year t-1 to t+2 (untabulated). 
We expect H1 to hold not only for extant CEOs, but also for new CEOs. Our premise for 
H1 is that restatements are related to CEO equity incentives that are “too high”. These 
incentives became too high because of the accumulation of high option (or stock) grants 
over time. That is, the options granted to CEOs in the pre-restatement period are likely to 
be higher than the optimal level. Thus, if the options granted to new CEOs after 
restatements are at the optimal level, they are likely to be lower than the options granted 
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to former CEOs, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, new CEOs might prefer more cash-based 
compensation in lieu of stock-based compensation because of the risk of further decline 
in the company’s stock price subsequent to the restatement. On the other hand, because 
new CEOs are likely to have a lower level of ownership in the company than former 
CEOs, restatement firms may actually award new CEOs more option grants than those 
given to former CEOs (Gilson and Vetsuypens 1993; Blackwell and Farrell 2004). We 
control for this effect by including existing holdings.  
To test whether the results from our main test of H1 hold for both extant and new 
CEOs, we estimate the following regression: 
,DummiesYearControls
t_NewCEORestatemen O t_ExtantCERestatemenGrants_Option b1a10
ε
ααα
++∆+
++=∆
β
 (2) 
where Restatement_ExtantCEO is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the restatement firm 
experienced no CEO turnover and Restatement_NewCEO is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the restatement firm experienced CEO turnover. Coefficients α1a and α1b thus capture 
the corresponding changes in option grant usage for these two groups, respectively. If H1 
holds for both groups, we expect both coefficients to be negative.  
Panel B of Table 5 reports results of regression (2). Consistent with H1, when using 
$Option%, we report a coefficient on Restatement_ExtantCEO of -6.3 that is significantly 
different from zero (p=0.05) and a coefficient of -9.4 on Restatement_NewCEO that is 
also significant (p=0.01).13 The inferences are the same when using #Option%: the 
coefficient on Restatement_ExtantCEO is -0.161 and the coefficient on 
Restatement_NewCEO is -0.166, both significant at the 0.01 level. These results indicate 
                                                 
13 These two coefficients are not significantly different from each other: the p-value based on an 
untabulated F-test is 0.55. 
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that relative to control firms, restatement firms grant both extant and new CEOs fewer 
option grants after restatements.  
4.3 Assessment of the Benchmark Year 
As discussed earlier, our benchmark year, year t-1, is the year before the 
restatement announcement year. However, prior research (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Efendi et al. 2007) uses the year prior to the earliest year restated as the benchmark year 
when investigating whether restatement firms have higher equity incentives than other 
firms. To test whether our results are sensitive to this alternative benchmark, we identify 
from press releases and SEC filings the fiscal year prior to the earliest year restated and 
conduct our analyses using this as our benchmark year. For convenience, we refer to this 
benchmark year as t-n. We first estimate model (1) in Table 5 for the period t-n to t+2 
and find coefficients of -6.3 and -0.9 on the restatement dummy for changes in $Option% 
and #Option%, respectively (untabulated). These results are qualitatively similar to those 
using t-1 as the benchmark year. 
We then examine whether restatement firms made any changes to option 
compensation from t-n to t-1, representing the longest possible period prior to the market 
discovering information about the restatement. Since the earliest year restated is the year 
of the announcement for about one-half of our sample firms, we conduct this analysis on 
the other half of our sample firms. Using the model from Panel A in Table 5, we report in 
Table 6 that restatement firms actually increased their option usage over this period. 
Using the dollar value of option grants, we find a coefficient of 8.9 on the restatement 
dummy, implying that restatement firms increased option usage by 8.9 percentage points 
more than control firms. We obtain similar inferences when using the number of option 
 23
grants. These results imply that restatement firms became more aggressive with option 
usage during periods when their financial statements were misstated, therefore providing 
support for our assumption that restatement firms reduced options usage only after their 
agency problem became known.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.4 Robustness tests for the Change in Option Grants 
We conduct the following series of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our 
results for H1. For brevity, we do not tabulate these analyses.  
 We expand our tests to include Top 5 executives other than the CEO and find that 
Option% also decreases in the post-restatement period for these executives. 
 We extend our analysis period to year t+3 and find further reductions in Option%. 
 To ensure that the results are not driven by unidentified unusual events in year t-1, we 
use the average $Option% in t-2 and t-1 as the benchmark when calculating the 
change in options usage, and find similar results.  
 Restatements vary in the nature (i.e., technical or not, income-decreasing or not) and 
magnitude. Controlling for these characteristics does not affect results.  
  Restatement firms likely experience corporate governance changes after 
restatements, and these changes may affect our results. We control for CEO/COB 
decoupling and find similar results.  
 To further control for industry and year fixed effects, we estimate the model in Table 
5 using two control firms from ExecuComp for each restatement firm, matched on 
two-digit SIC codes and year. The tenor of our results remains unchanged. This test 
also indicates that our results are not driven by economy-wide changes (e.g., internet 
bubble).  
 We measure the usage of option grants by the sensitivity of the value of option grants 
to both stock price (i.e., slope) and return volatility (i.e., convexity). We find that 
CEOs’ option grants have a lower slope and convexity following a restatement, 
compared to control firms. 
 
 
4.5 Within-Sample Analysis of Changes in Option Grants 
While the above results indicate that, on average, restatement firms reduce options 
usage after the announcement of the restatement, not all restatement firms reduce option 
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usage after restatement announcements.14 To investigate why some restatement firms do 
not reduce options usage following the restatement announcement, we use the following 
logit model to examine the determinants of the likelihood of reducing option 
compensation:  
εββ
βββ
βα
 +  + + +
 + + +
 +=
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where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the restatement firm 
reduced option grants from t-1 to t+2 and zero otherwise. We define this dummy variable 
alternatively based on $Option% and #Option%. Besides the factors that might affect 
option usage, namely CEO turnover and the independent variables in model (2), which 
are included as controls here, we identify six additional explanatory variables, as 
discussed below. 
While prior research finds that, on average, restatement firms had too high a level 
of equity incentives, we conjecture that this is more likely to be true for restatement firms 
that have high option grants prior to the restatement announcement. Accordingly, these 
firms are more likely to reduce option grants, compared to other restatement firms. To 
capture this within-sample variation, we construct an indicator variable, $Option%_Hight-
1 (#Option%_Hight-1), which equals 1 for restatement firms with $Option% (#Option%) 
in the top quartile of the sample distribution in year t-1.15 We predict a positive sign on 
the coefficients of these variables.  
As we argue in Section 2, restatement firms will change CEO compensation 
structure only when doing so yields a net benefit. Because the net benefit is likely to be 
                                                 
14 In our sample, 42% (47%) of restatement firms reduce $Option% (#Option%) from t-1 to t+2. 
15 The inferences are the same if we use continuous values for these and other variables.  
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lower when the restatements are technical, income-increasing, or small in dollar 
magnitude, we expect that firms that have restatements with these characteristics are less 
likely to reduce Option%. We collect detailed information about the restatements – their 
nature as well as the direction and magnitude of their impact on earnings – from 
restatement firms’ press releases or 10-Ks, whenever possible, and we construct three 
indicator variables to capture restatement-specific effects: Tech_Restatement for technical 
restatements, Inc_Restatement for income-increasing restatements, and 
Small_Restatement for firms with restatement magnitude in the bottom quartile of the 
sample distribution. See the legend to Table 7 for variable measurement. We predict 
negative coefficients on these variables.  
The market response to the restatement announcement might also capture the extent 
of the agency problem related to suboptimal option usage and firms’ incentive to reduce 
it. MktResponse is a dummy variable equal to one for firms with extremely negative 
(bottom quartile) size-adjusted abnormal returns for the three days centered around the 
announcement date of the restatement, and zero otherwise. We predict a positive sign on 
the coefficient of this variable.  
We also investigate whether an improvement in corporate governance, along the 
dimension of decoupling the joint CEO/Chairman of the board (COB) position, can 
facilitate the change in CEO compensation structure. Prior research suggests that when 
corporate governance is weak, firms award CEOs excessive option grants (e.g., Bebchuk 
et al. 2002) and are more likely to have accounting frauds (Dechow et al. 1996; Erickson 
et al. 2006). It seems plausible, therefore, that restatement firms that experience 
improvement in the dimension of decoupling the joint CEO/COB position are more likely 
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to reduce option grant usage. Thus, we expect that firms decoupling the joint CEO/COB 
position are more likely to reduce option grants. CEO/COB_Decouple is a dummy 
variable equal to one for firms that had the joint CEO/COB position in year t-1 and 
decoupled it by year t+2.  
We report the results of the logit regression in Table 7, first based on $Option% and 
then based on #Option%.16 We find that the likelihood of reducing option usage is higher 
for restatement firms that have higher level of options usage in year t-1. This relation also 
holds for firms with income-decreasing restatements, but only in the analysis using 
$Option%. We find no evidence that the likelihood of reducing option usage is higher for 
restatement firms that experience improvement in corporate governance.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5. Efficacy of Option Compensation Changes 
5.1 Subsequent Performance Improvement  
Our findings of reduced option grant usage suggest that, ex ante, there is a net 
economic benefit associated with a more optimal compensation contract. Otherwise, 
rational firms would not make this costly adjustment (Core and Larcker 2002). In this 
section, we examine whether the reduction in CEO option-based compensation yields a 
net economic benefit ex post. In our setting, we argue that the reduction in option-based 
compensation is likely to mitigate restatement firms’ agency problems related to the 
restatement and result in managerial decisions that are better aligned with shareholders’ 
interests. If in the pre-restatement period too high a level of option-based compensation 
                                                 
16 For the sake of brevity, we do not tabulate the results on control variables, which generally have 
insignificant coefficients except for firm size. Large firms are more likely to reduce option grants after 
restatement announcements.  
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resulted in excessive investments in risky projects and a fixation on the short-term stock 
price rather than a focus on operating efficiency, then a more optimal level of option-
based compensation can motivate managers to reduce excessive investments in risky 
capital projects, R&D, or marketing activities and/or to implement cost-cutting strategies. 
Since these excessively risky investments likely resulted in poor operating performance, a 
reduction in such investments should lead to improved operating performance. In 
addition, by decreasing earnings management incentives, the reduction in option-based 
compensation can induce managers to devote their efforts to productive activities rather 
than to earnings management (Demski et al. 2004). Therefore, if the recontracting is 
successful, then the reduction in CEO option-based compensation should increase 
operating performance. We formalize this prediction in the following hypothesis, stated 
in the alternative form: 
 H2: Compared to matched control firms, restatement firms that reduce 
option-based compensation following a restatement will experience 
improved operating performance. 
 
5.2 Primary tests of H2 
Because we observe that there were no significant changes in option grant usage 
until year t+2, we examine whether operating performance improved in year t+2 and 
afterwards. We define ROA as operating income (Compustat data13) scaled by average 
total assets,17 and calculate abnormal ROA using a matched-firm approach, as suggested 
by Barber and Lyon (1996). For each restatement firm, we select a firm that has the same 
2-digit SIC code and closest ROA in year t+1. (Note that since the event of interest here 
is the change in option grant usage after the restatement and not the restatement itself, the 
                                                 
17 The results based on operating income after depreciation are qualitatively similar. 
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benchmark year is thus one year before the occurrence of reduced option grant usage – 
year t+1.) For the restatement firms for which we are unable to find a matched firm using 
this approach, we choose a firm with the closest ROA without restrictions on industry 
membership, as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996).  
Table 8 presents the findings of our tests of the relation between changes in option 
grant usage and abnormal ROA in years t+2 and t+3.18 We provide results for those 
restatement firms that decreased $Option% and those that had no change or increase in it. 
ROA for the restatement firms that reduce $Option% is significantly greater than that for 
their corresponding matched firms. In the first (two) year(s) where we document a 
decrease in $Option% (i.e., year t+2, and years t+2 and t+3), these restatement firms 
significantly outperform their matched firms in ROA by a mean of 2.1% (5.6%).19 
Results based on medians are similar to those based on means.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
To investigate what drives this performance improvement, we decompose ROA into 
profit margin (operating income/sales) and asset turnover (sales/assets). We find that the 
improvement in ROA is due to improvements in profit margin. The difference in profit 
margin between restatement firms with reduced $Option% and their matched firms in 
year t+2 is significant at the 5% level, while the difference in asset turnover is 
insignificant (untabulated). Thus, it appears that restatement firms that reduce option-
based compensation focus on improving profit margin, which can be achieved reasonably 
                                                 
18 For year t+1, we find no differences in ROA between restatement firms and their corresponding matched 
firms, thus validating our matching procedure.  
19 Because most of the firms that experience a decrease in $Option% also experience a decrease in 
#Option%, the results are essentially the same when we conduct analyses based on the change in 
#Option%. In untabulated analyses, we find that the mean (median) change in ROA for firms with reduced 
number of option grants is 2.0% (0.7%) and 3.9% (2.9%) for year t+2 and years t+2 and t+3, respectively.  
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quickly by cutting excessive investments in R&D, marketing expenditures, unprofitable 
investments, or other operating costs.  
In contrast, for the restatement firms that do not reduce $Option%, we find no 
evidence of improved performance. The mean and median abnormal ROA for these firms 
are insignificantly different from zero in the two years after the benchmark year.20 
As noted above, there is significant CEO turnover in our sample. To investigate 
whether CEO turnover drives the improved operating performance, we partition our 
sample of restatement firms with reduced $Option% based on whether they experienced 
CEO turnover and analyze abnormal ROA separately for firms with and without CEO 
turnover. Results (untabulated) for each group are quantitatively similar to those reported 
in Table 8. Thus, CEO turnover is not driving our ROA results. 
5.3 Robustness tests for H2  
A concern with our ROA results is whether the act of reducing options itself leads 
to better performance or whether the underlying reasons for a firm to reduce options is 
what leads to better performance. That is, the ROA results reported in Table 8 are subject 
to a self-selection issue. To address this issue, we implement the Heckman (1979) two-
stage procedure. In the first stage, we obtain the inverse mills ratio from estimating the 
prediction model in Table 7. In the second stage, we include the inverse mills ratio in a 
regression of ROA on an indicator variable equal to one for firms that reduced the dollar 
value of options. For the regression of changes in ROA from t+1 to t+2, we obtain a 
                                                 
20 We also examine the market performance of these restatement firms using the methodology described in 
Barber and Lyon (1997). We find significantly positive abnormal returns in the two years after the release 
of year t+2 proxy statements for restatement firms with reduced $Option%, but not for those firms without 
reduced $Option%. However, it is difficult to draw reliable inferences from these results because they 
might be confounded by other firm-specific information in the proxy statements and because it is unclear 
when the capital markets learn about the compensation changes (Gaver et al. 1992).  
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positive and significant coefficient of 0.029 (p<0.05) on the option reduction dummy, 
while the coefficient on the inverse mills ratio is insignificant (untabulated). In 
untabulated results for the regression of changes in ROA from t+1 to t+2 and t+3, we find 
a positive and significant coefficient of 0.067 (p<0.05) on the option reduction dummy 
and an insignificant coefficient on the inverse mills ratio. These results indicate that a 
self-selection bias, to the extent it exists, does not appear to affect our results.  
We also perform additional sensitivity tests to control for CEO turnover, big bath 
write-offs, earnings management via accruals, and mean reversion of ROA, all of which 
leave our inferences unaffected. However, despite these robustness checks, we 
acknowledge that there are likely to be substantial changes to firm characteristics 
coincident to the change in compensation structure and that the performance results we 
document can be due in part to these changes.  
5.4 Reduction in Return Volatility 
A key component underlying our argument for H1 and H2 is that restatement firms 
had excessive risky investments in the pre-restatement period due to high levels of equity 
compensation and that the reduction in option compensation in the post-restatement 
period decreased the level of these investments. Consistent with this argument, we 
document in Section 4.4 that restatement firms experience a reduction in convexity 
following a restatement. Accordingly, we expect that the restatement firms that reduce 
option compensation will experience a decrease in stock return volatility. Following prior 
research, we use return volatility as a proxy for risky investments (e.g., Rajgopal and 
Shevlin 2002) and test whether restatement firms reduce the riskiness of their investments 
following the reduction in option grants. Specifically, we use the same matched firms 
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from our ROA tests (see Section 5.2), calculate the abnormal volatility for our sample of 
restatement firms as the difference between restatement firms and their matched control 
firms in the standard deviation of weekly stock returns, and then calculate the change in 
abnormal volatility from year t+1 to years t+2 or t+3. 
In Table 9 we provide results from these tests. As expected, for restatement firms 
with a decrease in $Option%, we find a change in mean (median) abnormal volatility of   
-0.011 (-0.016) from t+1 to t+2 that is significant at the 5% (1%) level. We find similar 
results for the change in abnormal volatility from t+1 to t+3. Based on untabulated 
analyses, we find that the volatility of these restatement firms is greater than that of their 
matched firms in year t+1 (significant at the 1% level), but by year t+2, these restatement 
firms have volatility levels that are similar to those of their matched firms (p=0.71). For 
restatement firms with a zero change or an increase in $Option%, however, we find no 
significant changes in abnormal volatility. These restatement firms have higher return 
volatility than their matched firms in all years, all significant at the 1% level (results 
untabulated).  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
In sum, we document a decrease in return volatility for restatement firms with a 
reduction in CEOs’ option grants. This finding, combined with the ROA results, suggests 
that these firms reduced the riskiness of their investments sufficiently to improve 
operating performance.  
6. Summary and Conclusions 
We examine whether firms with earnings restatements recontract with their CEOs 
after a restatement to reduce option-based compensation and, if so, whether this results in 
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improved operating performance. We predicate our study on the extant research that finds 
a positive relation between CEO equity incentives and the probability of earnings 
restatements, and on research that documents the costs of these restatements. Based on an 
analysis of 289 restatement firms over the period 1997-2001, we find that compared to 
control firms, restatement firms reduce the proportion of CEOs’ total compensation that 
is option-based following a restatement. This result holds for both extant and newly hired 
CEOs. Thus, restatement firms are likely to view reducing option-based compensation as 
an important means of resolving their agency problem. Furthermore, we find evidence of 
improved operating performance following the reduction in option-based compensation. 
This result dismisses the alternative explanation that the decrease in option-based 
compensation results from the negative public perception of option usage. Under this 
alternative explanation, restatement firms will not experience improved performance. 
Further analysis indicates that the performance improvement is partly attributed to a 
reduction in stock return volatility, which reflects the underlying riskiness of these firms’ 
investments. This result highlights that a significant economic benefit accrues to firms 
that adjust option-based compensation toward a more optimal level.  
We contribute to the literature on the determinants of compensation structure by 
documenting that earnings restatements are strongly associated with subsequent 
reductions in CEO option-based compensation. In addition, our study complements Core 
and Larcker (2002), who use a setting in which managerial ownership levels are 
apparently too low and find that increases in managerial ownership are associated with 
improved firm performance. In contrast to Core and Larcker (2002), we utilize a setting 
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in which managerial ownership levels are apparently too high and provide evidence that 
reducing these levels is beneficial to the firm.  
This paper also complements studies investigating other monitoring changes in 
response to financial reporting failures (e.g., Farber 2005; Srinivasan 2005; Desai et al. 
2006). Collectively, these studies suggest that firms improve a broad spectrum of 
governance mechanisms to reduce the agency problems associated with financial 
reporting failures. An important limitation of our study is that we treat changes in these 
other mechanisms as exogenous. Investigation of how changes in these governance 
mechanisms are jointly determined appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research.  
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Appendix 
Description of Control Variables 
 
CEO stock ownership. Low stock ownership may indicate that the CEOs’ interests 
are not optimally aligned with those of shareholders. Prior research finds that when a 
CEO’s stock or option ownership is low, the firm tends to award this manager more 
option or stock grants (Core and Guay 1999; Bryan et al. 2000). To measure CEO 
ownership, we use the actual number of shares owned (Shares_Own) and the number of 
both exercisable (Exercisable_Options) and unexercisable options 
(Unexercisable_Options), all scaled by shares outstanding. We predict negative signs on 
the coefficients of these variables.21  
Firm size. Prior research argues that the optimal level of equity incentives increases 
with firm size (Size) (Core and Guay 1999). The larger the firm, the more complex it 
becomes, giving rise to agency conflicts. Also, CEOs of large firms tend to be wealthier 
and need more stock-based compensation to be motivated to work in the interests of 
shareholders. We therefore predict a positive sign on the coefficient of Size, which we 
measure as the natural logarithm of sales.  
Growth opportunity. It is difficult for shareholders to determine the appropriate 
corporate/operational strategy for a growth firm. Thus, it is likely that growth firms 
provide their managers with higher equity incentives to align their interests with those of 
shareholders (Smith and Watts 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993). Consistent with prior 
research (Core and Guay 1999; Hanlon et al. 2003), we use the book-to-market ratio 
                                                 
21 We choose not to use the dollar value of the equity holdings for two reasons. First, agency theory (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling 1976) suggests that the percentage of shares owned by the CEO is an appropriate 
measure of agency problem and thus a good determinant of option-based compensation. Second, the value 
of existing holdings is confounded by the restatement. As discussed before, restatements are associated 
with large decreases in stock price, which decreases the value of CEOs’ existing holdings. This may lead to 
an increase in Option% if shareholders want to maintain the same level of CEOs’ equity incentives (in 
dollars). That is, the decrease in stock and option values biases against finding results consistent with H1.  
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(B/M) and research and development intensity (R&D) to proxy for growth. We predict a 
negative coefficient on (B/M) and a positive coefficient on R&D.  
Cash Constraints.22 Compared to cash-based compensation, such as salary and 
bonus, stock-based compensation exerts relatively little pressure on a company’s current 
cash flow. Thus, firms with cash constraints are more likely to use stock-based 
compensation (Yermack 1995; Dechow et al. 1996). As in prior research, we measure 
cash constraints (Cash Constraint) as common and preferred dividends plus cash flows 
used in investment activities minus cash flows from operations, divided by total assets. 
We predict a positive sign on the coefficient of this variable.  
Earnings constraints. Firms with earnings constraints (Earn Constraint) are also 
more likely to use option-based compensation because it was not expensed in our sample 
period if the exercise price is set at the stock price on the grant date. We use a dummy 
variable to indicate firms with an operating loss. However, because the empirical 
evidence on the relation between Earn Constraint and stock-based compensation is 
mixed (Yermack 1995; Core and Guay 1999; Bryan et al. 2000), we make no directional 
prediction for the coefficient on this variable.  
Leverage. If a CEO’s stock-based compensation induces risk-taking, then 
shareholders receive a benefit over debtholders. It follows that shareholders will bear this 
debt agency cost in the form of higher interest. Therefore, stock-based compensation will 
be negatively related to debt. In addition, debt financing also serves as a monitoring 
mechanism that can reduce the need for stock-based compensation. Consistent with these 
arguments, Bryan et al. (2000) identify a negative relation between incentive-intensity 
                                                 
22 We also considered using free cash flow to control for the extent of agency problems, but because it is 
closely related to cash constraints, we opted not to use it. 
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and leverage (Lev). We measure Lev as long-term debt divided by total assets and predict 
a negative sign on the coefficient of this variable. 
Idiosyncratic Risk. Prior research finds a positive relation between equity incentives 
and a firm’s idiosyncratic risk (Idiosyncratic Risk) (e.g., Core and Guay 1999; Hanlon et 
al. 2003). When the uncertainty (i.e., idiosyncratic risk) surrounding a firm’s performance 
is higher, it is more difficult for shareholders to monitor managers, thus making it more 
likely that the firm will use option-based compensation to motivate managers. We 
measure Idiosyncratic Risk as the standard deviation of the residual from the market 
model over the prior 12 months and predict a positive sign on its coefficient. 
Stock Returns. Prior research finds a positive relation between a firm’s current 
returns (Current Return) and CEO compensation (Baber et al. 1996 and Hanlon et al. 
2003), consistent with CEOs being compensated for good firm performance. Hanlon et 
al. (2003) also find that firms with greater lagged stock returns (Past Return) grant more 
stock options to their CEOs. We likewise use these variables and predict positive signs on 
their coefficients. 
Cash Compensation. With greater cash compensation - a proxy for outside wealth - 
managers can reduce their risk-aversion through better diversification, thus reducing the 
need of using options grants to encourage managers to invest in risky projects (Guay 
1999). In support of this prediction, Hanlon et al. (2003) find that firms with greater CEO 
cash compensation (Cash Compensation) grant fewer stock options. However, this 
relation can be positive as firms might award managers additional cash compensation to 
offset the additional risk they bear through increased option grants. We therefore do not 
predict a sign on the coefficient on this variable. 
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Table 1 
Sample reconciliation and descriptive statistics of restatement firms 
 
This table describes the sample selection process of our restatement sample – 289 restatements 
announced in the period 1997-2001, and the characteristics of the restatements and restatement 
firms.  
 
Panel A: Sample reconciliation 
 
Restriction  
Sample 
Size 
 
Number of restatements per GAO in the period 1997-2002  
 
919 
 
Less:  
 
Firms with fiscal year of restatement announcement later than 2001 a 135 
 
Firms without basic financial data from Compustat (i.e., sales, total 
assets, book value, net income) 204 
 
Firms without returns data from CRSP in the three trading days around 
the restatement announcement 55 
 
Firms with missing compensation data for the pre- or post-restatement 
period  228 
  
Firms with multiple restatements in the same year b 8 630 
 
Final restatement sample  
 
289 
 
a This restriction ensures that we have compensation data available at least for the second year 
after restatements. 
b We keep only the first observation for firms with multiple restatements in the same year. 
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Table 1 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Yearly distribution of restatements 
 
   
Restatement Announcement Year 
   
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
 
n 
 
37 
 
24 
 
77 
 
70 
 
81 
 
289 
 
% of total 12.8% 8.3% 26.6% 24.2% 28.1% 100%  
 
Panel C: Restatement characteristics 
 
 Frequency
Percentage 
of total 
 
Full sample 289 100% 
 
Initiated by  
SEC 54 18.7% 
Auditor 23 8.0% 
Company 116 40.1% 
Unknown 96 33.2% 
 
Exchange Listing  
NYSE 117 40.5% 
AMEX 12 4.1% 
Nasdaq 160 55.4% 
 
Reason*   
Revenue recognition 127 43.9% 
Restructuring 35 12.1% 
Cost or expense 32 11.1% 
Merger and acquisition 22 7.6% 
In-process R&D 18 6.2% 
Securities related 15 5.2% 
Other 40 13.9%  
 
*Reason is per GAO (2002) report.  
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Table 1 (cont’d) 
 
Panel D: Industry classification of restatement firms 
 
 
Industry 
 
2-Digit SIC Code 
 
n  
 
%
 
Oil and Gas 
 
13 5 1.73
Food Products 20 6 2.08
Paper and Paper Products 24-27 6 2.08
Chemical Products 28 17 5.88
Manufacturing 30-34 10 3.46
Computer Equipment and Services 35, 73 75 25.95
Electronic Equipment 36 24 8.30
Transportation 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45 14 4.84
Scientific Instruments 38 19 6.57
Durable Goods 50 7 2.42
Retail 53-57, 59 25 8.65
Eating and Drinking Establishments 58 2 0.69
Entertainment Services 70, 78, 79 6 2.08
Health 80 5 1.73
Professional Services 87 8 2.77
All Others All others 60 20.76
   
Total  289 100%
 
 
Panel E: Restatement firms’ financial characteristics in the restatement year  
 
 Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
Market Value ($ million)  3,878.4 12,292.2 62.9 289.8 1,786.8
Total Assets ($ million)  3,553.3 8,825.7 118.4 419.7 2,348.6
Sales ($ million)  2,628.3 6,392.3 81.3 349.0 1,671.3
Book Value ($ million)  1,016.7 2,363.6 29.3 156.2 821.1
Operating Income ($ million)  165.7 873.1 -7.3 15.6 132.9
Book-to-Market Ratio  0.672 0.641 0.219 0.494 0.881
Leverage  0.187 0.192 0.004 0.139 0.318
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Table 2 
Distributional statistics of annual CEO compensation and its components  
for restatement firms  
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of CEO compensation and its components in the pre- and 
post-restatement periods for restatement firms. All variables are measured in $000, except for 
#Option%, which is the number of option grants (in number of shares) scaled by total shares 
outstanding, in percentage. The two-sided p-values are based on t-statistics for the difference in 
the means. (Because the variables are highly skewed, we take logs and then compute t-statistics.) 
 
Year relative to 
Restatement 
Announcement  Salary Bonus 
Stock 
Option 
Grants 
Restricted 
Stock 
Grants 
Other 
Comp. 
Total 
Comp. #Option% 
 
-1 (n=286) Mean 
 
431.3 
 
371.9 
 
2,405.7 
 
251.5 217.5 
 
3,677.9 0.494 
 Q1 200.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 391.4 0.000 
 Median 316.0 112.5 283.0 0.0 15.2 1,164.2 0.110 
 Q3 583.9 382.5 2,039.3 0.0 136.5 3,435.7 0.413 
 
+1 (n=271†) Mean 483.6 422.1 2,347.5 
 
323.4 256.6 
 
3,833.1 0.544 
 Q1 247.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 522.6 0.000 
 Median 397.7 133.0 362.5 0.0 20.6 1,233.8 0.158 
 Q3 650.0 434.2 2,382.7 0.0 120.2 4,206.4 0.536 
 
+2 (n=286) Mean 503.8 393.6 1,948.9 393.9 424.0 3,664.3 0.369 
 Q1 255.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 442.4 0.000 
 Median 400.0 100.0 118.3 0.0 21.1 1,035.6 0.081 
 Q3 700.0 447.7 1,149.6 0.0 128.7 3,520.1 0.374 
 
p-value for the difference 
in means between years  
t-1 and t+2 0.033 0.484 0.078 0.993 0.182 0.858 
 
 
 
0.033 
 
† Because we focus on year t+2 in our main analyses, we require all observations of sample or 
control firms to have compensation data in year t+2. Some of these observations have missing 
compensation data in year t+1, resulting in a smaller sample in year t+1. 
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Table 3 
Univariate analyses of mean changes in CEO stock option grants  
for restatement and control firms 
 
This table reports the mean difference in CEO option grants between the pre- and post-
restatement period for restatement firms and control firms. Year t is the restatement 
announcement year. Control firms are non-restatement firms with compensation data from 
ExecuComp.  
 
Panel A: Option grants measured as the value of CEO annual stock option grants scaled 
by the value of CEO total annual compensation ($Option%) 
 
 
 
 
Mean difference in 
$Option% between 
years t-1 and t+1 
Mean difference in 
$Option% between 
years t-1 and t+2 
 
Restatement firms (1) 
 
 
 
1.9% 
(n=271)† 
 
-5.6%*** 
(n=286) 
 
 
Control firms (2) 
 
 
3.2%*** 
(n=7,329)† 
2.6%*** 
(n=7,343) 
 
(1) – (2) -1.3% -8.2%*** 
(p-value) (0.275)  (0.001) 
 
Panel B: Option grants measured as the number of CEO annual stock option grants (in 
number of shares) scaled by total shares outstanding (#Option%) 
 
 
 
 
Mean difference in 
#Option% between 
years t-1 and t+1 
Mean difference in 
#Option% between 
years t-1 and t+2 
 
Restatement firms (1) 
 
 
 
0.07% 
(n=271)† 
 
-0.13%** 
(n=286) 
 
 
Control firms (2) 
 
 
0.01%* 
(n=7,329)† 
0.00% 
(n=7,343) 
 
(1) – (2) 0.06% -0.13%** 
(p-value) (0.450)  (0.032) 
 
*** (**, *) Indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, one-sided for restatement firms and the 
difference between restatement firms and control firms, and two-tailed for control firms. 
† Because we focus on year t+2 in our main analyses, we require all observations of sample or 
control firms to have compensation data in year t+2. Some of these observations have missing 
compensation data in year t+1, resulting in a smaller sample size for the comparison between t-1 
and t+1 than for the comparison between t-1 and t+2. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics and correlations of variables  
for restatement and control firms  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (n=5,948) 
 
 Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
 
∆$Option%   2.401 33.684 -13.451 0.000 19.921 
∆#Option%  0.006 0.505 -0.070 0.000 0.113 
Restatement  0.031 0.174 0.000 0.000 0.000 
∆Shares_Own (%)  -0.703 3.239 -0.409 0.000 0.116 
∆Exercisable_Options (%)  0.133 0.820 -0.102 0.054 0.385 
∆Unexercisable_Options (%)  0.068 0.689 -0.125 0.009 0.249 
∆Size  0.284 0.450 0.041 0.240 0.506 
∆B/M  0.088 0.436 -0.107 0.023 0.197 
∆R&D  -0.001 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 
∆Cash_Constraint  -0.017 0.148 -0.090 -0.011 0.057 
∆Earn_Constraint  0.042 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.000 
∆Lev  0.018 0.119 -0.036 0.000 0.069 
∆Idiosyncratic Risk  0.009 0.024 -0.005 0.007 0.022 
∆Current Return  -0.115 0.789 -0.443 -0.074 0.290 
∆Past Return  -0.054 0.683 -0.403 -0.039 0.288 
∆Cash Compensation  -0.333 1.848 -0.434 -0.085 0.089 
 
∆$Option% is the difference in the dollar value of annual CEO option-based compensation 
scaled by annual CEO total compensation (in percent) between year t-1 and t+2, where year t is 
the restatement year. ∆#Option% is the difference in option grants in number of shares scaled by 
total shares outstanding between year t-1 and year t+2. Restatement is 1 for restatement firms 
and 0 otherwise. All control variables are measured as the difference (∆) between years t-2 and 
t+1, except for current return, which is measured between years t-1 and t. Shares_Own (%) is 
CEO ownership in shares scaled by outstanding shares; Exercisable_Options (%) is the CEO’s 
exercisable options in shares scaled by outstanding shares; Unexercisable_Options (%) is the 
CEO’s unexercisable options in shares scaled by outstanding shares; Size is the natural log of 
sales (in $million, Compustat data12); B/M is the book-to-market ratio, measured as book value 
(data 60) divided by market value (data25*data199); R&D is research and development expense 
(data46) scaled by total assets (data6); Cash_Constraint is measured as common and preferred 
dividends (data127) plus net cash flow used in investment activities (data311) minus net cash 
flow from operations (data308), divided by total assets (data6); Earn_Constraint equals one if 
there is an operating loss (i.e., if data178 is negative) and zero otherwise; Lev is measured as 
long-term debt (data9) divided by total assets (data6); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard 
deviation of the residual from the market model using weekly returns over 12 months; Current 
Return is the accumulated monthly stock return for the current year; Past Return is the 
accumulated monthly stock return for the last year; Cash Compensation is the sum of salary and 
bonus scaled by sales.  
  
All means are different from zero at the 1% level.  
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Table 4 (cont’d)  
Panel B: Spearman Correlations between option grants and independent variables, with p-values in parentheses (n=5,948) 
 ∆$Option% 
 
∆#Option% Restatement 
∆Shares_ 
Own (%) 
∆Ex. 
Options 
(%) 
∆Unex. 
Options 
(%) ∆Size ∆B/M ∆R&D 
∆Cash_ 
Constraint 
∆Earn_ 
Constraint ∆Lev 
∆Idio. 
Risk 
∆Current 
return 
∆Past 
return 
∆#Option% 
 
0.578 
 
             
 
Restatement -0.059 
 
-0.059              
∆Shares_Own (%) -0.080 -0.055 -0.022             
∆Exercisable_ 
Options (%) -0.118 -0.132 -0.019 0.104            
∆Unexercisable_ 
Options (%) -0.086 0.071 -0.034 0.009 0.080           
∆Size 0.056 -0.041 0.019 -0.123 -0.080 -0.075          
∆B/M -0.106 0.047 0.066 -0.036 0.008 -0.052 -0.066         
∆R&D -0.017 0.027 0.040 0.003 0.007 0.019 -0.103 0.008        
∆Cash_ 
Constraint 0.037 0.011 -0.051 0.020 0.028 -0.002 -0.008 -0.066 0.033       
∆Earn_Constraint -0.074 0.013 0.095 0.008 -0.004 -0.061 -0.172 0.208 0.152 0.023      
∆Lev -0.029 0.011 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 0.012 0.071 -0.015 -0.018 0.189 0.046     
∆Idiosyncratic Risk -0.026 0.051 0.087 0.023 -0.067 0.009 -0.038 0.199 0.078 0.012 0.163 0.099    
∆Current return 0.060 -0.027 -0.025 0.049 0.018 0.105 -0.064 -0.382 -0.041 -0.037 -0.221 -0.095 -0.042   
∆Past return 0.059 -0.043 -0.001 0.042 0.027 0.041 0.049 -0.260 -0.084 0.076 -0.149 -0.095 -0.090 0.029  
∆Cash Compensation -0.028 0.034 -0.020 0.066 0.069 0.101 -0.474 -0.027 0.129 0.040 0.050 -0.075 0.003† 0.137 0.002 
 
Note: See Panel A of this table for variable definitions. Items in bold indicate significance at the 0.05 level. 
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 Table 5 
Regression analyses of changes in CEO option-based compensation  
 
This table reports regression results of the following equations for the period t-1 to t+2, where t is 
the restatement announcement year: 
εαα ++∆++=∆ − DummiesYearControlstRestatemenGrantsOption β10    (1) 
,DummiesYearControls
t_NewCEORestatemen O t_ExtantCERestatemenGrants_Option b1a10
ε
ααα
++∆+
++=∆
β
 (2) 
Option_Grants is defined as either $Option% or #Option%. $Option% is the dollar value of 
annual CEO stock option compensation scaled by annual CEO total compensation, in percent. 
#Option% is option grants in number of shares scaled by shares outstanding, in percent. 
Restatement_ExtantCEO (Restatement_NewCEO) is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
restatement firm did not experience (experienced) CEO turnover during the analysis period and 
zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Panel A of Table 4.  
 
Panel A: Impact of restatement on option grants for full sample 
 
  
 
∆$Option% 
(A)  
∆#Option% 
(B) 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
Estimate t-statistic  
Coefficient 
Estimate t-statistic 
 
Intercept ? 9.142 8.02***  0.116 6.68*** 
Restatement - -7.829 -3.17***  -0.164 -4.37*** 
∆Shares_Own - -0.785 -5.94***  -0.008 -3.86*** 
∆Exercisable_Options - -4.089 -7.83***  -0.075 -9.49*** 
∆Unexercisable_Options - -4.447 -7.14***  -0.051 -5.38*** 
∆Size + -0.237 -0.21  -0.065 -3.91 
∆B/M - -5.133 -4.54***  0.049 2.83 
∆R&D + -0.992 -0.06  0.353 1.35 
∆Cash_Constraint + 7.267 2.48***  0.026 0.58 
∆Earn_Constraint ? -3.363 -2.25**  -0.022 -0.95 
∆Lev - -10.665 -2.88***  0.017 0.30 
∆Idiosyncratic Risk + -74.343 -3.72  0.299 0.99 
∆Current Return + 0.253 0.40  -0.021 -2.26 
∆Past Return + 2.022 3.00***  -0.016 -1.55 
∆Cash Compensation ? -0.241 -0.91  0.008 2.02** 
       
n (restatement/control)  186/5,762   186/5,762  
Adj. R2  0.068   0.045  
*** (*) indicates significance at the 1% (10%) level (one-sided for variables with predicted signs, two-
sided otherwise). The results for year dummies are omitted for brevity. 
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Table 5 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Impact of restatement on option grants across New and Extant CEOs 
 
  
 
∆$Option% 
(A)  
∆#Option% 
(B) 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
Estimate t-statistic  
Coefficient 
Estimate t-statistic 
 
Intercept ? 9.137 8.02***  0.116 6.68*** 
Restatement_ExtantCEO - -6.322 -1.84**  -0.161 -3.09*** 
Restatement_NewCEO - -9.355 -2.71***  -0.166 -3.17*** 
∆Shares_Own - -0.788 -5.94***  -0.008 -3.86*** 
∆Exercisable_Options - -4.113 -7.83***  -0.075 -9.49*** 
∆Unexercisable_Options - -4.436 -7.14***  -0.051 -5.38*** 
∆Size + -0.238 -0.21  -0.066 -3.91 
∆B/M - -5.121 -4.54***  0.049 2.83 
∆R&D + -1.238 -0.06  0.352 1.35 
∆Cash_Constraint + 7.214 2.48***  0.026 0.58 
∆Earn_Constraint ? -3.339 -2.25**  -0.022 -0.95 
∆Lev - -10.586 -2.88***  0.017 0.30 
∆Idiosyncratic Risk + -73.892 -3.72  0.300 0.99 
∆Current Return + 0.262 0.40  -0.021 -2.26 
∆Past Return + 2.017 3.00***  -0.016 -1.55 
∆Cash Compensation ? -0.236 -0.90  0.008 2.02** 
       
n (restatement/control)  186/5,762   186/5,762  
Adj. R2  0.068   0.045  
*** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level (one-sided for variables with predicted signs, 
two-sided otherwise). The results for year dummies are omitted for brevity. 
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Table 6 
Analyses of changes in CEO option compensation from the year prior to the earliest 
year restated to the year prior to the restatement announcement  
 
This table reports regression results of the following equations for the period t-n to t-1, where t is 
the restatement announcement year and t-n is the year prior to the earliest year restated: 
εαα ++∆++=∆ − DummiesYearControlstRestatemenGrantsOption β10   (1) 
Option_Grants is defined as either $Option% or #Option%. $Option% is the dollar value of 
annual CEO stock option compensation scaled by annual CEO total compensation, in percent. 
#Option% is option grants in number of shares scaled by shares outstanding, in percent. All 
other variables are defined in Panel A of Table 4. The restatement firm sample restricts to 
restatement firms with different t-n and t-1. 
 
  
∆$Option% 
(A)  
∆#Option% 
(B) 
Variable  
Coefficient 
Estimate t-statistic  
Coefficient 
Estimate t-statistic 
 
Intercept  3.165 3.11***  0.045 2.95*** 
Restatement  8.923 2.50***  0.152 2.92*** 
∆Shares_Own  0.005 7.73**  0.000 4.15*** 
∆Exercisable_Options  -7.438 -7.81***  0.061 4.31*** 
∆Unexercisable_Options  -0.056 -32.47***  -0.001 -41.33*** 
∆Size  -1.032 -0.47  -0.108 -3.27*** 
∆B/M  -1.701 -0.65  0.185 4.68*** 
∆R&D  15.714 0.70  1.229 3.64*** 
∆Cash_Constraint  -5.050 -1.68*  -0.154 -3.43*** 
∆Earn_Constraint  2.512 1.37*  -0.015 -0.53 
∆Lev  -7.486 -1.23  0.048 0.52 
∆Idiosyncratic Risk  -43.679 -1.55*  -0.188 -0.45 
∆Current Return  2.094 2.46***  -0.012 -0.92 
∆Past Return  0.558 0.72  -0.015 -1.28 
∆Cash Compensation  -1.457 -3.51***  -0.004 -0.63 
       
n (restatement/control)  67/5,580   72/5,584  
Adj. R2  0.167   0.260  
*** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level based on two-sided tests. The results for year 
dummies are omitted for brevity.  
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Table 7 
Cross-sectional analysis of changes in CEO option compensation 
 
This table reports the results from the following logit regression: 
εββ
βββ
βα
 +  + + +
 + + +
 +=
Controls  coupleCEO/COB_De eMktRespons 
 atementSmall_Rest  ementInc_Restat  tementTech_Resta
ghOption%_Hi    Grants) Option (Reducing Pr
65
432
1-t1
γ
 (3) 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the restatement firm reduced option 
grants from t-1 to t+2 and zero otherwise, defined alternatively based on $Option% and 
#Option%. $Option%_Hight-1 (#Option%_Hight-1) is an indicator variable equal to 1 for 
restatement firms with $Option% (#Option%) in the top quartile of the sample distribution in 
the year prior to the restatement announcement. Tech_Restatement is a dummy variable equal to 
one for technical restatements. Technical restatements refer to those related to SAB 101, in-
process R&D, and other restatements that we deemed to be not clearly in violation of GAAP. 
Inc_Restatements is a dummy variable equal to one for restatements in which the restated 
earnings are the same as or lower than original earnings. There are 43 restatements in our sample 
where the originally reported numbers are the same or lower than the restated earnings. 
Small_Restatement is a dummy variable equal to one for restatements in the bottom 75% of the 
magnitude of restatements. Restatement magnitude refers to the dollar magnitude of the 
restatement, scaled by total assets in year t-1. MktResponse is a dummy variable equal to one for 
restatement firms with extremely negative (bottom 25%) size- adjusted returns for a three day 
window around the restatement announcement. CEO/COB_Decouple is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the restatement firm had the joint CEO/COB position in year t-1 and decoupled this 
position by year t+2. Size is the log of total assets in year t-1. Controls represent all control 
variables used in Table 5 and the CEO turnover indicator variable, which equals to one if there is 
a new CEO in t+2 compared to t-1. Please refer to Table 5 for the list of the control variables. 
 
  
Indicator for reduction in 
$Option% 
 Indicator for reduction in 
#Option% 
Variable 
Predicted  
sign 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
p-value 
(two-sided) 
 Coefficient 
Estimate 
p-value  
(two-sided) 
 
Intercept ? -2.782 0.001  -4.335 0.001 
$Option%_High t-1 + 2.406 0.001    
#Option%_High t-1 +    4.703 0.001 
Tech_Restatement - -0.229 0.678  -0.246 0.655 
Inc_Restatement  - -1.992 0.002  -0.807 0.159 
Small_Restatement  - 0.960 0.111  0.663 0.224 
MktResponse + 0.515 0.349  0.642 0.271 
CEO/COB_Decouple + 0.340 0.423  -0.707 0.156 
Control variables  Yes   Yes  
       
n   152   154  
Pseudo Adj. R2  0.441   0.538  
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Table 8 
Operating performance after changes in CEO option-based compensation 
 
This table reports abnormal operating performance for restatement firms after the changes in 
CEO option-based compensation in year t+2 (t = restatement announcement year). We calculate 
abnormal ROA using a matched-firm approach, as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996), where 
the matched firm is the firm in the same industry (2-digit SIC codes) with ROA closest to that of 
the restatement firm in year t+1. $Option% is the ratio of the dollar value of annual CEO option 
compensation to total annual CEO compensation. p-values are one-sided for the subsample with 
reduced $Option% and two-sided otherwise. The tests of means are based on t-statistics and the 
tests of medians are based on Wilcoxon signed tests. 
 
  
Predicted 
sign 
 
t+2 
 
t+2 and t+3 
 
Restatement firms with decrease in $Option%    
 
Mean 
 
+ 
 
2.1% 
 
5.6% 
(p-value)  (0.037) (0.008) 
    
Median + 0.6% 2.9% 
(p-value)  (0.065) (0.003) 
 
N  115 106 
    
Restatement firms with zero change or increase in $Option% 
 
Mean 
 
? 
 
-0.4% 
 
-0.8% 
(p-value)  (0.972) (0.722) 
    
Median ? -0.9% -2.3% 
(p-value)  (0.101) (0.113) 
N 
 
157 143 
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Table 9 
Analysis of changes in Return Volatility 
 
This table provides an analysis of the change in abnormal stock return volatility from year t+1 to 
the second (t+2) and third (t+3) year following restatement. We measure abnormal volatility as 
the difference in the standard deviation of weekly stock returns between restatement firms and 
their corresponding matched firms. See Table 8 for the choice of matched firms. $Option% is the 
ratio of the dollar value of annual CEO option compensation to total annual CEO compensation. 
p-values are one-sided for the subsample with reduced $Option% and two-sided otherwise. The 
tests of means are based on t-statistics and the tests of medians are based on Wilcoxon signed 
tests. 
 
  
Predicted 
sign 
 
t+2 
 
t+3 
 
Restatement firms with decrease in $Option%    
 
Mean 
 
- 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.011 
(p-value)  (0.043) (0.061) 
    
Median - -0.016 -0.014 
(p-value)  (0.009) (0.007) 
 
N  108 103 
    
Restatement firms with zero change or increase in $Option% 
 
Mean 
 
? 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.004 
(p-value)  (0.958) (0.464) 
    
Median ? 0.001 -0.005 
(p-value)  (0.857) (0.373) 
N 
 
146 141 
 
